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Abstract. Consumer co-operatives constitute a highly successful ex-
ample of democratic forms of enterprises operating in developed coun-
tries. They are usually organized as medium or large-scale ￿rms compet-
ing with pro￿t-seeking ￿rms in retail industries. In this paper we model
such a situation as a mixed oligopoly in which consumer co-operatives
maximize consumer-members￿ utilities and distribute them a patron-
age rebate on their goods purchase. We show that when consumers
possess quasilinear preferences over a bundle of symmetrically di⁄eren-
tiated goods and ￿rms operate with a linear technology, the presence of
consumer co-operatives positively a⁄ects all industries output and social
welfare. The e⁄ect of Co-ops on welfare is shown to be more signi￿cant
when goods are either complements or highly di⁄erentiated and when
competition is ￿ la Cournot rather than ￿ la Bertrand.
Keywords: Consumer Co-operatives, Pro￿t-maximizing Firms, Mixed
Oligopoly.
JEL Classi￿cation Number: L21, L22, L31
1. Introduction
Since 1844, the Rochdale pioneers￿idea of cooperation has spread around
the world and today more than 700 millions cooperators are active in 100
countries (ICA, 2006). Among the various cooperative forms of enterprises,
consumer cooperatives (henceforth Coops) are typically ￿rms which operate
in retail industries pursuing the institutional objective to act on behalf of
their consumer-members.
1 Today these organizations represent one of the
most successful realities among existing democratic and participative forms
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of enterprise, able to compete against large private companies. Formed
through a discontinuous process of sequential waves (see, for instance, for a
brief account of the US case, Finch, Trombley & Rabas, 1998) in many coun-
tries Coops are well established without in general possessing a dominant
position in retail industries, with a few exception as, for instance, Switzer-
land, Finland and Japan. One of the most world￿ s well known consumer
cooperative is the Cooperative Group in UK, which provides a variety of
retail and ￿nancial services. Japan is also known to possess a very relevant
consumer Cooperative movement with over 23,5 millions members and with
retail cooperatives alone scoring in 2006 a turnover of about 374 billions of
yen (Japanese Consumers￿Cooperative Union, 2006). In Italy, the largest
group of consumer cooperatives represents today a serious competitor to
private companies operating in retail industry. Among the top 30 Italian
retail companies, 9 are consumer cooperatives, with a recorded turnover of
about 12,9 billions of euro in 2009, corresponding to around 18% of the
total market share (E-coop 2010). The European Association of Consumer
Cooperatives estimates that in Europe approximately 3,200 consumer coop-
eratives are active, with a total turnover of 70 billions of euro, employing
300,000 workers and serving about 25 millions of consumer-members (Euro
Coop, 2008).
So far, the economic literature on consumer cooperatives (e.g. Enke 1945,
Anderson, Porter & Maurice 1979, 1980, Ireland and Law 1980, Sexton 1983,
Sexton and Sexton 1987, Farrell 1985, and more recently, Hart and Moore,
1996, 1998 and Mikami, 2003, 2010) has mainly focussed on the behaviour
of these ￿rms under either perfect competition, monopoly or monopolistic
competition. However, in modern economies Coops compete strategically
with traditional pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms (henceforth PMFs), therefore giving
rise to a speci￿c instance of mixed oligopoly.
2
To the best of our knowledge, there are no existing contributions dealing
speci￿cally with mixed oligopoly between Coops and PMFs. An exception is
Goering (2008) who presents a homogeneous good duopoly model between
a PMF and a non pro￿t ￿rm assumed to maximize a parametrized combi-
nation of ￿rm￿ s pro￿t and consumers￿surplus. Moreover, there is a wide
related literature dealing with mixed duopoly with a labour-managed ￿rm ￿
la Ward (1958) and Vanek (1970) competing with a PMF (see, for instance
Law and Stewart, 1983 and Cremer and CremØr, 1992) as well as a wide
literature on agricultural cooperatives under imperfectly competitive mar-
kets (Rodhes, 1983, Fulton, 1989, Sexton, 1990) or under mixed duopoly
with either homogeneous (Tennbakk, 1992) or vertically di⁄erentiated good
(Fulton and Giannakas, 2001). However, in general labour-managed and
In large Co-ops the assembly elects a board of directors which, on their behalf, controls
the management.
2See, for instance, Delbono and De Fraja (1990) for a survey of mixed oligopoly models
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farmers￿cooperatives are thought to behave di⁄erently from an organiza-
tion owned by its consumers.
The major purpose of our paper is to present a taxonomy of the results
obtained in a mixed oligopoly market in which an arbitrary number of PMFs
and Coops compete strategically either in quantities or in prices and goods
are di⁄erentiated. We model a Coop as a ￿rm which maximizes the utility of
consumer-members and distributes them all its net surplus as a patronage
rebate on their purchased goods. As a result, a Coop is shown to set in
equilibrium a price equal to its average cost, thus a⁄ecting the equilibrium
behaviour of rival PMFs. All ￿rms are assumed to possess a constant returns
of scale technology and therefore in equilibrium every Coop sets a price equal
to its constant marginal cost. In our model, the marginal cost pricing rule
emerges endogenously. This pricing rule makes the results of our model
comparable to those obtained in mixed oligopoly models with state-owned
and PMFs (for instance, CremŁr, Marchand and Thisse,1998 and De Fraja
and Delbono, 1998). Moreover, the constant average cost assumption has
the advantage to overcome many of the issues on the stability of Co-ops￿
membership.
3
Our model reaches a few relevant relevant results. We show that, under
consumers￿quasilinear preferences and ￿rms￿linear technology, the presence
of Coops in the market a⁄ects positively the total industry output as well
as the total industry welfare (and negatively the market prices). Under
Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous goods it is shown that the presence of
Coops pushes all PMFs out of the market (or, alternatively, oblige them to
behave as perfectly competitive ￿rms) and by this way maximizes the total
market welfare. When goods are di⁄erentiated, the e⁄ect of Coops on welfare
is shown to be more signi￿cant when goods are either complements or highly
di⁄erentiated and when competition is ￿ la Cournot (in quantities) rather
than ￿ la Bertrand (in prices). According to these results, we should expect
to see consumer cooperatives more often in markets with such features.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 and 4 present the main results of mixed oligopoly with quantity and price
competition. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
2.1. Consumers Preferences. The demand side of the market is repre-
sented by a continuum of identical consumers (i = 1;::;I) of unitary total
measure possessing quasi-linear preferences on n symmetrically di⁄erenti-
ated goods4 xk, (k = 1;:::;n) and an outside good y. These preferences
3See on this matter, Anderson, Maurice & Porter (1979), Sandler & Tschirhart (1981),
Sexton (1983) and Sexton & Sexton (1990).
4Each good can also be interpreted as a bundle of goods sold by every ￿rm in the
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can be expressed, for each consumer, by a utility function Ui : Rn+1
+ ! R+
de￿ned over the n products and a separate numeraire good y, as
(2.1) Ui (x1;x2;:;xk;::;xn;y) = ui (x1;x2;:;xk;::;xn) + yi
in which ui (:) is smooth, increasing and strictly concave in every good xk.5
If the available income of every consumer (denoted yi) is high enough,
the downward-sloping individual inverse demands can be obtained from the





; for xk > 0 and k = 1;2;:::n:
2.2. Industry. In the retail industry we assume that in general n ￿rms
supply n di⁄erentiated goods (or bundles of goods) whose m are supplied by
consumer cooperatives and (n ￿ m) by traditional pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms.
We will denote by M ￿ N the subset of ￿rms which are Coops. As usual,
PMFs ￿rms are assumed to maximize pro￿ts as
(2.2) ￿k (x1;:::xn) = pk (x1;x2;:::xn)xk ￿ ck(xk):
Let every ￿rm￿total costs be linear and, for simplicity, ￿rms do not bear
￿xed costs. As anticipated, Coops are assumed to act on behalf of their
consumer-members, therefore maximizing the utility function of every i-
th representative consumer-member. More speci￿cally, every member of
the Coop receives a patronage refund in proportion to the goods he has
purchased over the ￿rm￿ s total sales. The following objective-function is






















(pj (x1;:;xn)xj ￿ cj (xj)):
Analogously, when price instead of quantity is the choice variables of every
￿rm, the above objective functions for PMFs and Coops can be expressed
as a function of the price vector (p1;p2;::pn).
For every j 2 M the FOC of problem (2.3) provides the following condi-











as long as the equilibrium price is su¢ ciently high to generate non negative





xj . The meaning of (2.4) is that a
Coop, acting on behalf of its consumer-members, sets its quantity to equate
every consumer-member￿ s willingness to pay for good j to the average cost
5The Hessian of U
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of this good,6 in order to distribute the maximum consumers￿surplus to its
members. Since here ￿rms possess a constant returns of scale technology,
every ￿rm￿ s marginal cost will be just equal to its average cost. The use of a
di⁄erentiated goods oligopoly is a feature which distinguishes our setup from
the numerous existing mixed oligopoly models in which, either state-owned
￿rms (Marchand et al. 1998 for instance) or no-pro￿t organizations (Fulton
and Giannakas, 2001, Goering, 2008) compete with PMFs, but goods are in
general homogeneous.
It can be useful to compare problem (2.3) to the case in which a social
manager is assumed to coordinate all existing consumer cooperatives in order
to maximize the utility of all existing consumers. In this case we should
















Therefore, for the collectivity of consumer-members the best pricing policy
would be to set a price lower than average cost when product are substi-
tute (
@pr(x1;::;xn;y)




3. Oligopoly with Quantity Competition
In order to study the implications of the simultaneous presence of both
PMFs and Coops in an oligopolistic market, let the following utility function
represent the preferences of every i-th consumer in the economy, (i = 1;::;I):7
(3.1)























where ￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 [1=(1 ￿ n);1] represents the degree of product
di⁄erentiation. For ￿ = 0, goods are independent and for ￿ = 1 goods
are perfect substitute. Moreover, for ￿ < 0 goods become complement.
The FOCs of (3.1) yield linear inverse demand functions for every good
k = 1;2;::;n given by
(3.2) ￿ ￿ xk ￿ ￿
X
r6=k
xr = pk for xk > 0:
It is easy to see that the FOC of problem (2.3) yield the following condi-
tions for every Coop producing the j-th good
6Similarly, if competition is in prices, a Co-op will set a price equal to the average cost.
7See Shubik ans Levitan (1971), Vives (1984) and Dixit (1983) for further details on
this utility speci￿cation.6 MARCO MARINI AND ALBERTO ZEVI






for xj > 0.
Expression (3.3) can be considered as the FOC of every Coop acting on
behalf of consumer-members.
3.1. The Benchmark Case: Oligopoly with all PMFs. As a bench-
mark case of our results we start illustrating the case in which all ￿rms are
PMFs and choice variables are quantities. Let all ￿rms k = 1;2;:::n possess-
ing identical strategy sets Xk = [0;1) and identical technology, expressed
by a linear cost function, ck (xk) = cxk with 0 < c < ￿. When ￿rms are all
PMFs they simply maximize their pro￿t with respect to the quantity of the
k-th good,




Solving the maximization problem, the following best-replies are obtained




(￿ ￿ ￿x￿k ￿ c)
where x￿k = (x1;x2;::;xk￿1;xk+1;::;xn) and therefore pure-PMF Nash
equilibrium quantities (x1;x2;:::;xn) are easily obtained as
(3.5) xk =
(￿ ￿ c)
2 + ￿ (n ￿ 1)
for each k-th PMF and prices are
pk (x1;:;xn) =
￿ + c + ￿c(n ￿ 1)
￿ (n ￿ 1) + 2
:
It easy to see that, for ￿ = 1, (3.5) becomes the usual Cournot solution
with homogenous good (xk = (￿ ￿ c)=(n + 1)), while for ￿ = 0 the goods
are independent and ￿rms act monopolistically (xk = (￿ ￿ c)=2).
3.2. Mixed Cournot Oligopoly. Let us imagine now that m ￿rms in
the market (m ￿ n) transform into Coops accepting all consumers as their
members. The market turns therefore into a mixed oligopoly in which m
Coops compete against (n ￿ m) standard PMFs. Let M ￿ N denotes the
set of all j-th Coops and then NnM is the set of all remaining h-th PMFs.
Using (3.3) and (3.4), the following best-replies are obtained for Coops









￿ ￿ ￿(n ￿ m)xh ￿ c
1 + ￿ (m ￿ 1)








￿ ￿ ￿mxj ￿ c
2 + ￿ (n ￿ m ￿ 1)
, 8h 2 NnM:
The mixed oligopoly Nash equilibrium output, denoted x￿ with m Coops
and (n ￿ m) PMFs is therefore obtained as
(3.8) x￿
j =
(2 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ c)




(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ c)
2 + (n + m ￿ 3)￿ ￿ (n ￿ 1)￿2; 8h 2 NnM;





￿ + c + ￿ (c(2m + n ￿ 2) ￿ ￿(m + 1)) + ￿2 (m￿ ￿ c(n + m ￿ 1))
2 + (n + m ￿ 3)￿ ￿ (n ￿ 1)￿2





for every j-th Coop.
It is easy to see that, in general, if goods are perfect substitute (￿ = 1)
the model yields the extreme prediction that the presence of even just one
Coop in the market pushes PMFs out of the market. This could, alterna-
tively, be interpreted as if the presence of Coops has obliged all PMFs to
adopt a perfectly competitive behaviour, in order to stay in the market. In
either way, since market equilibrium price coincides with all ￿rms￿average
and marginal cost, every consumer￿ s willingness-to-pay for the homogeneous
good is just equal to every ￿rm￿ s marginal cost of production and this implies
a welfare maximization (since u0 = c). These results are condensed in the




k is equal to
(3.10) X￿ = mx￿
j + (n ￿ m)x￿
h =
(￿ ￿ c)(n(1 ￿ ￿) + m)
2 + (n + m ￿ 3)￿ ￿ (n ￿ 1)￿2
For m = 0 the above expression coincides with the pure n-PMFs pure
oligopoly X￿(m = 0) =
n(￿￿c)
2+￿(n￿1) and for m = n the expression turns into the
pure Coop total quantity, with X￿(m = n) =
n(￿￿c)
1+￿(n￿1). It is easy to see that
a pure Coop oligopoly yields a higher output than a pure PMF oligopoly.
Moreover, expression (3.10) shows that the output grows monotonically with
the number of Coops in the market.8 MARCO MARINI AND ALBERTO ZEVI
Proposition 1. Under mixed oligopoly in quantities and homogeneous good
(￿ = 1), the presence of even just one Coop in the market implies that all
PMFs become inactive, that the output is greater than that obtained with all
PMFs and that the total welfare of the economy is maximized.
Proof. For the ￿rst result, note that, when ￿ = 1, conditions (3.3) and (3.4)








￿ ￿ (n ￿ m)xh ￿ c
m








￿ ￿ mxj ￿ c
(n ￿ m + 1)





















+ 0 = (￿ ￿ c) >
X
k
xk = n(￿ ￿ c)=(n + 1)
The welfare of the economy is de￿ned as the sum of consumers￿surplus and
of ￿rms￿pro￿ts, which in this case are equal to zero. Using (3.1) and (3.13)
this becomes:






































A + y￿ =























which is also the maximum welfare obtainable in the market. ￿
Moreover, some simple results can be obtained for ￿ 2 [0;1].
Proposition 2. Under a mixed oligopoly in quantities, for ￿ 2 [0;1] the
output of a Coop is always greater than the output of a PMF, that is, x￿
j > x￿
h
for every j 2 M and h 2 NnM. Moreover, for ￿ 2 [0;1], x￿
j > xk ￿ x￿
h.CONSUMERS CO-OPERATIVES & MIXED OLIGOPOLY 9
Proof. The ￿rst result can be easily checked by direct inspection of expres-
sions (3.9) and (3.8). The second result can be proved by noting that, for
every j 2 M and every k 2 N,
(3.14) x￿
j ￿ xk =
(￿ (n ￿ m ￿ 1) + 2)(￿ ￿ c)
￿
￿ (n + m ￿ 3) ￿ ￿2(n ￿ 1) + 2
￿
(￿ (n ￿ 1) + 2)
and expression (3.14) is always strictly positive for ￿ 2 [0;1] and n ￿ 2.




2 + ￿ (n ￿ 1)
￿
(￿ ￿ c)(1 ￿ ￿)
2 + ￿ (n + m) ￿ ￿2 (n ￿ 1) ￿ 3￿
is equal to zero for ￿ = 0, since xk(￿ = 0) = x￿
h(￿ = 0) = (￿ ￿ c)=2,
while for ￿ = 1, xk(￿ = 1) = (￿ ￿ c)=(n + 1) > x￿
h(￿ = 1) = 0. Finally,





￿(n + m ￿ 3) + ￿2 (1 ￿ n) + 2
￿




￿(n + m ￿ 3) + ￿2 (1 ￿ n) + 2
￿
> 0
which is always satis￿ed for ￿ 2 (0;1). ￿
3.3. Welfare Analysis: PMFs vs. Mixed Oligopoly. The analysis of
welfare under mixed oligopoly with di⁄erentiated goods requires a careful
calculation of the interacting e⁄ects of the simultaneous presence of Coops
and PMFs on consumer surplus and pro￿ts in all markets. By the prop-
erty of quasi-linear preferences, consumers￿welfare can be measured exactly
through consumers￿surplus and this in turn corresponds to the utility of
consumers purchasing the goods. Therefore, we can proceed by computing
the welfare under all various forms of oligopoly.
In a pure PMF oligopoly, for every k-th good produced, the total welfare







pk(￿)d￿ ￿ pk (x1;x2;; ::;xn)x￿
k + pk (x1;x2;; ::;xn)xk ￿ cxk
= U (x1;x2;; ::;xn) ￿ cxk + y:
As a result, summing up the total welfare generated in all n symmetrically
di⁄erentiated markets and using utility function (3.1), we obtain
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which, by symmetry, can written as
(3.15) TWPMF = (￿ ￿ c)n ￿ xk ￿ (1=2)
h
n(xk)




Under mixed oligopoly, the total welfare generated in every j-th Coop mar-



























































































which, by the symmetry of every j-th Coop and every h-th PMF, can be
written as


















j + ￿ (n ￿ m)x￿
jx￿




Now, by (3.5), (3.8) and (3.9) we obtain the following expressions for the
total welfare, respectively, in a pure PMFs￿oligopoly

















2 (3 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))
(2 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))
2 + y;
in a pure Coops￿oligopoly


















1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1)
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and in a mixed oligopoly with m Coops and (n ￿ m) PMFs,




































































Expression (3.18) illustrates the fact that in a mixed oligopoly the welfare
is the sum of the welfare generated in the (n ￿ m) markets in which PMFs
are active and which generated in the m markets in which retail cooperatives
are, in turn, active.
For illustrative purposes in the next section we will focus on the case of
mixed duopoly compared, respectively, to a pure PMF and a pure Coop
duopoly. We show that the presence of Coops can be relatively more ben-
e￿cial in some circumstances than in others and, in particular, for speci￿c
levels of product di⁄erentiation.
3.4. The Duopoly Case. The main feature of a mixed duopoly between
a PMF and a Coop is which to break the symmetry of ￿rms￿behaviour.
When competition is ￿ la Cournot, the best-reply of the Coop is
(3.19) xj (xh) = (￿ ￿ ￿xh ￿ c);
and which of the PMF is
(3.20) xh (xj) =
1
2
(￿ ￿ ￿xj ￿ c):
It is clear that a PMF usually possesses a downward sloping best-reply




(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ c)
2 ￿ ￿212 MARCO MARINI AND ALBERTO ZEVI
for the PMF and
(3.22) x￿
j =
(2 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ c)
2 ￿ ￿2
for the Coop. It is important to notice that the asymmetry of the two ￿rms￿
quantities is mitigated when goods are either highly di⁄erentiated (low ￿)





2 ￿ ￿2 :
This is because high product di⁄erentiation mitigates competition and ag-
gressive behaviour among ￿rms, hence decreasing their equilibrium output.
If we compare the output of ￿rms under mixed duopoly to which of a pure




as well as to the case of a pure Coop duopoly (denoted e x),
(3.24) e xk =
(2 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ c)
2 + ￿ ￿ ￿2
we note that since quantities are strategic substitutes (Bulow et al., 1985)
Coop￿ s output is positively a⁄ected by the presence of a di⁄erent type of
competitor, while PMF￿ s is not. In terms of price, a PMF competing with
a Coop experiences a price reduction with respect to a pure PMF market,
given that
ph (x￿) =
￿ + c ￿ 2(￿ ￿ c)￿ + (￿ ￿ 2c)￿2
2 ￿ ￿2
pj (x￿) = c
pk (x) =
￿ + ￿ (1 + c)
2 + ￿
:
Moreover, it is easy to see that
ph (x￿) ￿ pk (x) =
(￿ ￿ c)
￿






￿ 0 for ￿ 2 [0;1]:
Given the above comparative statics, we can now compare the total welfare
generated in all pure and mixed cases. By (3.16), (3.17) and (3.18) we obtain
that total welfare is, respectively,
TWPMF =
(￿ ￿ c)
2 (3 + ￿)
(2 + ￿)
2
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in a mixed duopoly.
The picture below shows that in term of total welfare a pure Coop duopoly
(continuous line) outperforms both a pure PMF duopoly and a mixed duopoly
for any degree of good di⁄erentiation. This is obvious, given that a pure
Coop basically acts as a welfare maximizer. As already proved in proposition
1, under mixed duopoly (dotted line) for ￿ = 1 (homogeneous goods) only
the Coop remains in the market and the welfare is, therefore, maximized.
Moreover, it can be noticed that the relative e¢ ciency of the mixed duopoly
with respect to the pure PMF duopoly (circled line) is higher when goods
are either complement (￿ < 0) or highly di⁄erentiated. When goods become
more and more homogeneous, the welfare loss determined in a pure PMF
with respect to the mixed duopoly or to the pure Coop duopoly, decreases
progressively, although never vanishes. Similarly, the mixed oligopoly ap-
proximates the maximum social welfare better and better for goods becom-
ing increasingly substitute.












Figure 1 - Pure PMF (circled line), pure Co-op (continuous line) and mixed
duopoly total welfare (dotted line) for (￿ ￿ c) = 1 and ￿ = [￿0:5;1]:
3.5. Welfare Comparison with More than Two Firms. With more
than two ￿rms that compete ￿ la Cournot the results obtained above con-
tinue to hold. In picture 2 we show a simulation with three ￿rms competing
in quantities. Again, a pure Coop market outperforms all other possible
market forms for any degree of good di⁄erentiation. However, a simple an-
alytical comparison shows that when goods are substitute (￿ > 0) in term
of total welfare the pure Coop oligopoly becomes less and less advantageous14 MARCO MARINI AND ALBERTO ZEVI
with respect to a pure PMF oligopoly when both n and ￿ increase. When
competition is high (which happens for high n and ￿) the di⁄erent forms of
market do not perform too di⁄erently, and the welfare generated is not too
dissimilar. This is expressed in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. When the number of ￿rms in the market increases and
goods become increasingly substitutes (higher ￿), the di⁄erence between wel-
fare generated in a pure Coop oligopoly and which generated in a pure PMF
oligopoly, decreases progressively.
Proof. Straightforward manipulations show that the following expression














(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))(2 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))
2
is monotonically decreasing in both ￿ and n for n > 1 and 1 ￿ ￿ > 0. ￿
When goods are complements, (￿ ￿ 0), the e⁄ect of a higher number of
￿rms on (3.25) becomes positive.











Figure 2 - Pure PMF (ircled line) pure Co-op (continuous rline) and mixed
triopoly total welfare with m = 1 (dotted line), m = 2 (squared line) for n = 3,
(￿ ￿ c) = 1 and ￿ = [￿0:1;1].
As shown in picture 2, with more than two ￿rms the presence of Coops
are still highly bene￿cial in terms of social welfare. It can also be noticed
that when both the number of ￿rms and the substitution rate among goods
increase, the relative advantage of Coops in terms of welfare shrinks pro-
gressively. Therefore, if the model is not too far from reality and consumer
cooperatives arise with the purpose to meet consumers￿needs, we shouldCONSUMERS CO-OPERATIVES & MIXED OLIGOPOLY 15
expect them establishing their business mostly in highly monopolistic mar-
kets in which goods are either highly di⁄erentiated or complements. In the
next section, we will consider the case of price competition.
4. Competition in Prices
It can be interesting to compare the case of quantity competition to that
of price competition in order to see if some di⁄erences arise. One obvious
relevant di⁄erence is the fact that, when goods are perfectly homogeneous,
Bertrand competition yields the extreme prediction of marginal pricing re-
gardless of the objective functions of ￿rms competing in the market.
4.1. Oligopoly with all PMFs. When all ￿rms are PMFs, we ￿rstly ob-
tain the direct demand for each k-th good as function of prices,
xk (p1;p2;::;pn) =
￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ pk ￿ (n ￿ 2)￿pk + ￿
P
h6=k ph
(1 ￿ ￿)((n ￿ 1)￿ + 1)
for k = 1;2;::;n and ￿ 6= 1. As a result, every PMF￿ s pro￿t function can be
written as













￿(1 ￿ ￿) + c(n ￿ 2)￿ + c + ￿p￿k
￿ (n ￿ 2) + 1
where p￿k = (p1;p2;::;pk￿1;pk+1;::;pn).
By symmetry, the Nash equilibrium price of every k-th PMF is obtained
as
(4.2) pk =
(￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿c(n ￿ 2) + c)
￿ (n ￿ 3) + 2
with associated quantities:
(4.3) xk (p1;p2;::;pn) =
(￿ ￿ c)(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 2))
(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))(2 + ￿ (n ￿ 3))
and pro￿ts
￿k (p1;:;pn) = (pk ￿ c) ￿ xk (p1;:;pn) =
(￿ ￿ c)
2 (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 2))
(2 + ￿ (n ￿ 3))
2 (1 + ￿(n ￿ 1))
:16 MARCO MARINI AND ALBERTO ZEVI
4.2. Mixed Oligopoly with Price Competition. Again we imagine that
m ￿ n ￿rms in the market behave as Coops. Using (3.1) and (3.4), we obtain
the following direct demands for every PMF h 2 NnM,
(4.4) xh (p1;:;pn) =




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿(n ￿ 1))
and every Coop j 2 M
(4.5) xj (p1;:;pn) =




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿(n ￿ 1))
for ￿ 6= 1. By (4.4) we can write the pro￿t-function of every PMF as function
of prices,








and, through simple manipulations, the following mixed oligopoly equilib-







￿(1 ￿ ￿) + c(1 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 2))
2 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 3)
p￿
j = c;





(￿ ￿ c)(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 2))






(￿ ￿ c)(2 + ￿ (2n ￿ 3))
(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))(2 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 3))
;






2 (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ (n ￿ 2) + 1)
(2 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 3))
2 (1 + n￿ ￿ ￿)
:
A few comparisons can now be made.
Proposition 4. Under price competition and ￿ 2 [0;1], the mixed oligopoly
prices are for all ￿rms either lower or equal than pure PMF oligopoly prices,
that is, pk ￿ p￿
h ￿ p￿
j for every j 2 M, h 2 NnM and k = 1;2;::n. Moreover,
xj (p￿) ￿ xk (p) ￿ xh (p￿).CONSUMERS CO-OPERATIVES & MIXED OLIGOPOLY 17
Proof. By expressions (4.2), (4.6) and by the property of Bertrand equilib-
rium, when goods are homogeneous (￿ = 1) there is no di⁄erence between
mixed and pure oligopoly equilibrium prices, since pk = p￿
j = p￿
h = c: When
goods are independent (￿ = 0) all PMFs behave as monopolists under both
pure and mixed oligopoly, with p￿
h = pk =
a + c
2
while, also in this case,
Coops behave as perfectly competitive ￿rms, setting p￿
j = c. Moreover, for
￿ 2 (0;1) it is easy to check that
(pk ￿ p￿
h) =
(￿ ￿ c)(1 ￿ ￿)m￿
(2 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 3))(2 + ￿ (n ￿ 3))
;






(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ c)￿
(2 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 3))
2 > 0
for n ￿ 1: About the second group of results, note that, for ￿ = 0




and, for every j-th Coops,
(4.9) xj (p￿;￿ = 0) = (￿ ￿ c);
and therefore
xj (p￿;￿ = 0) > xh (p￿;￿ = 0) = xk (p;￿ = 0):
Moreover, for ￿ = 1, in term of output all types of oligopoly perform
similarly with




When ￿ 2 (0;1), a simple inspection of (4.3) and (4.7) shows that, for
m ￿ 1,
xk (p) > xh (p￿):
Finally, for ￿ 2 (0;1) we have that
xj (p￿)￿xk (p) =
￿
￿ (3n ￿ m ￿ 5) + ￿2 ￿




(2 + ￿ (n + m ￿ 3))(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))(2 + ￿ (n ￿ 3))
whose both numerator and denominator are strictly positive within the de-
￿ned range of parameters. ￿
4.3. Welfare Comparison under Price Competition. For sake of brevity
we relegate in appendix all calculations of total welfare with price compe-
tition under both pure and mixed oligopoly. We report here the results,
which are not too dissimilar from those obtained for the case of quantity18 MARCO MARINI AND ALBERTO ZEVI
competition. Total welfare under mixed oligopoly with an arbitrary number











(1+￿(n￿1))(2+￿(n+m￿3)) | {z }
P
j2M TWj
where in expression above we have again decomposed the total welfare in
two distinct parts. Setting in (4.10) m = 0 we can obtain the pure PMF





2 (1 + ￿ (n ￿ 2))(3 + ￿ (n ￿ 4))
(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))(2 + ￿ (n ￿ 3))
2






(1 + ￿ (n ￿ 1))
2:
It can be noticed that the pure Coop oligopoly always yields the economy
maximum welfare no matter if competition is ￿ la Cournot or ￿ la Bertrand.
Again, for illustrative purposes, in the following section we present the duo-
ply case in order to underline the main di⁄erences between price and quan-
tity competition.
4.4. The Duopoly Case with Price Competition. When both ￿rms
in the market are PMFs, we can compute the following direct demand for
every k-th good (k = 1;2) as function of the price vector (p1;p2), for ￿ 6= 1
xk (p1;p2) =
￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ p1 + ￿p2 ￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
and pro￿t functions
￿1 (p1;p2) = (p1 ￿ c)
 
￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ p1 + ￿p2 ￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
!
￿2 (p1;p2) = (p2 ￿ c)
 















￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿p1 + c
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿CONSUMERS CO-OPERATIVES & MIXED OLIGOPOLY 19




p1 = p2 =
￿(1 ￿ ￿) + c
2 ￿ ￿ (1 + 2￿)
for ￿ 6= 1
and p1 = p2 = c for ￿ = 1;
with associated quantities equal to:
x1 (p1;p2) = x1 (p1;p2) =
￿ ￿ c
(1 + ￿)(2 ￿ ￿)
:
Let us now immagine that ￿rm 1 is a pure Coop and ￿rm 2 a pure PMF.
When the Coop distributes entirely its pro￿ts, the FOC of the representative
consumer￿ s utility becomes, respectively for good 1 and good 2:
￿ ￿ x1 ￿ ￿x2 ￿ c = 0
￿ ￿ x2 ￿ ￿x1 ￿ p2 = 0
from which the following demand functions are derived as function of
prices, for ￿ 6= 1:
x1 (p1;p2) =




￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ p2 + ￿c
￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿ :
Pro￿t functions can be de￿ned as:
￿1 (p1;p2) = (p1 ￿ c)
 




￿2 (p1;p2) = (p2 ￿ c)
 





Di⁄erentiating the two expressions, the following best-reply functions are







2 (￿(1 ￿ ￿) + c(1 + ￿)) for ￿ 6= 1
p￿
2 = c for ￿ = 1:
with associated quantities for ￿ 6= 1,8
8Note that the equilibrium quanties are obtained plugging into direct demands (4.4) and
(4.5) the equilibrium prices. Since the latter are not de￿ned for ￿ = 1, the equilibrium
outputs are similarly not de￿ned for this value. Ouput levels for ￿ = 1 are simply



































for ￿ = 1. Finally, if both ￿rms are Coops, their equilibrium quantity will
be equal to




It can be noticed that, di⁄erently from the case of quantity competition,
here the Coop￿ s best-reply is completely independent of the price of its
rival. Therefore, under Bertrand competition the speci￿c leader-follower
con￿guration in which the PMF is leader and the Coop is follower would
not yield any di⁄erence when compared to the simultaneous case presented
above. The same cannot be said under Cournot competition.
If we now compute the welfare yielded under duopoly, the following ex-
pressions, for m = 0;1;2, respectively, are obtained as
TWPMF =
(￿ ￿ c)
2 (3 ￿ 2￿)














By plotting the three expressions within the range of ￿ does not yield par-
ticular di⁄erences with respect to the case of Cournot competition, except
that here all types of markets, included the pure PMF-duopoly, yields the
marginal cost pricing and then the maximum welfare for ￿ = 1. Therefore,
under Bertrand competition and homogeneous goods we observe a perfect
"isomorphism" in the behaviour of all ￿rms.CONSUMERS CO-OPERATIVES & MIXED OLIGOPOLY 21












Figure 3- Pure PMF (circled line), pure Co-op (continuous line) and mixed
duopoly total welfare (dotted line) for (￿ ￿ c) = 1 and ￿ = [￿0:5;1]:
Extending the welfare comparisons to more than two ￿rms shows that, again,
the analysis is qualitatively similar to that of Cournot competition, as shown
in ￿gure 4.











Figure 4 - Total welfare of a pure PMF ( circled line), of a mixed triopoly with
m = 1 (dotted line) and m = 2 (squared line) and of a pure Co-op (continuous
line) for n = 3, (a ￿ c) = 1 and ￿ = [￿0:1;1].
An important di⁄erence between Bertrand and Cournot competition emerges
in terms of the welfare loss of a pure PMF oligopoly with respect to a pure
Coop oligopoly. As shown below in ￿gure 5, this loss is de￿nitively larger
under quantity than under price competition and the di⁄erence is particu-
larly high when goods are reasonably homogeneous, therefore making under22 MARCO MARINI AND ALBERTO ZEVI
these circumstances the presence of at least one Coop in the market de-
￿nitively more bene￿cial under Cournot than under Bertrand competition.
Additional welfare comparisons between Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies
are relegated in the appendix.












Fig.5 - Total welfare in a pure PMF duopoly market under Cournot (circled line)
and Bertrand (dotted line) compettion compared to a pure Co-op market
(continuous line) for (a ￿ c) = 1 and ￿ 2 [￿0:5;1]:
5. Concluding Remarks
Although in general consumer cooperatives are well established in many
countries, their actual behaviour is still largely unknown and requires ad-
ditional research, in particular to understand the e⁄ects of their strategic
interaction with traditional pro￿t maximizing ￿rms in oligopolistic markets.
This paper has attempted to make a ￿rst step in this direction, showing
the main e⁄ects arising in a mixed oligopoly with pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms
and consumer cooperarives competing either ￿ la Cournot or ￿ la Bertand
in markets with heterogeneous goods. We have shown that the presence
of Coops is bene￿cial for industries output and social welfare in mainly two
cases. The ￿rst under Cournot comeptition, when goods are perfectly homo-
geneous and therefore Coops behave so expansively to expel PMFs from the
market, or, if interpreted di⁄erently, to oblige them to behave as perfectly
competitive ￿rms, setting a price equal to the marginal cost and making zero
pro￿t as a result. The second case is when goods are either complements or
highly di⁄erentiated, for which the presence of Coops appears particularly
valuable for markets, by increasing considerably their output and welfare.
In this paper we have also shown that Coops a⁄ects relatively more the
total welfare under Cournot than under Bertrand competition. Therefore,
according to our model, consumer cooperatives should behave in a not too
dissimilar way to traditional pro￿t maximizing ￿rms in all retail marketsCONSUMERS CO-OPERATIVES & MIXED OLIGOPOLY 23
in which goods are highly (but not completely) homogeneous and in which
competition happens mostly in prices. As a reaction to these market forces,
Coops could attempt to propose their customers genuinely di⁄erentiated
goods and, in this way, enhance consumers￿welfare and accomplish their
authentic objective function.
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6. Appendix
6.1. Total Welfare under Price Competition. Using (3.15) and (4.3)
we obtain the pure PMF-oligopoly welfare under price competition as































In a pure Coops￿Bertrand oligopoly with n ￿rms we obtain




















Moreover, using (4.7) and (4.8) and knowing that




















j + ￿ (n ￿ m)x￿
jx￿
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and the total welfare obtained in all markets in which Coops operate,
X
j2M










































A welfare comparison between Bertrand (6.2) and Cournot total welfare
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We can plot the two expressions above for ￿ = [￿0:5;1].












Fig. 6 - Total Welfare di⁄erence between Bertrand and Cournot
comeptition under both pure PMF duopoly (continuous line) and mixed
duopoly (dotted line) for (a ￿ c) = 1, n = 2 and ￿ = [￿0:5;1].
The ￿rst thing to notice is that both expressions are not monotonic in ￿.
Moreover, the welfare di⁄erences between price and quantity competition
are in general larger under pure PMF duopoly than under mixed duopoly.
In both cases such a di⁄erence is high when goods are complements. When
goods are substitutes, we have that in a pure PMF duopoly the di⁄erence
in welfare between Bertand and Cournot competition increases with beta.
Conversely, In a mixed duopoly such a di⁄erence ￿rst increases and then
decreases to ￿nally disappear for ￿ = 1. Note that for n > 2, the qualitative
results shown above continue to hold.